Why
have China's rulers launched a crackdown on Falun Gong?
Why did party chiefs declare the group a serious threat
to the Communist Party and the most grave danger to
the regime since the Tiananmen movement of 1989? Why
has the leadership ordered a massive effort to denounce
the group, destroy millions of its publications, detain
thousands of its members, and seek the arrest and extradition
of its leader from the United States? What was so troubling
about a movement whose millions of devotees practice
traditional qigong exercises at home and in public parks,
whose leader preaches an eclectic blend of Buddhist-inspired
and Taoist-influenced quasi-religious beliefs mixed
with folk millenarianism, and whose proclaimed goal
is improving followers' physical and moral health by
channeling cosmic energy and leading ethical lives?
Although hardly presenting an immediate or substantial
challenge to the regime's ability to rule, Falun Gong
conjures nearly all of the demons that haunt the PRC's
leaders. The dangers that the group evokes strike at
each major aspect of the contemporary Chinese Communist
Party's identity and the bases for its authority. Indeed,
a review of possible reasons for the current campaign
provides an archaeological tour of the several-layered
character of the reform-era party-state and the vulnerabilities
its leaders perceive.
First,
the PRC's rulers have enough of a sense of history to
recognize that they are -- or at least that many of
their people see them as -- the latest in a succession
of dynasties to rule China. From that perspective, Falun
Gong has looked uncomfortably like the sects that were
major forces in past rebellions that shook the empire
or ended imperial lines. For the keepers of the House
of Mao, Falun Gong's qigong routines surely called up
images of the turn- of-the-century Fists of Righteousness
and Harmony, whose members believed that their pugilist-like
calisthenics made them immune to bullets and whose failed
Boxer Uprising marked the death throes of the Qing dynasty.
The
Falun Gong leader Li Hongzhi's reported claims to share
a birthday with the Buddha Sakyamuni and to possess
supernatural powers suggested parallels to the mid-nineteenth
century Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, whose adherents followed
the self- proclaimed younger brother of Jesus Christ
in a vast revolt that severely damaged China's last
imperial dynasty. Its blend of popular Chinese religious
doctrines and declinist rhetoric likely seemed all too
reminiscent of the Yellow Turbans, White Lotus and other
colorfully named sects that had rallied awesome forces
of discontent around religious beliefs during earlier
dynasties. When Falun Gong's adherents massed outside
the senior Chinese leaders' compound in April in silent
protest over their treatment by a regime that denied
them the protection and status generally accorded to
law-abiding organizations, the denizens of Zhongnanhai
doubtless heard echoes of the popular movements that
challenged the emperors who once lived in the Imperial
Palace next door (as well as the reverberations of the
Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989).
For
party leaders with an especially strong penchant for
history and hyperbole, the repeated Falun Gong demonstrations
in Beijing and many other cities this spring and summer,
along with other signs of the group's widespread following,
could set tongues wagging about signs of the loss of
the mandate of heaven - the traditional Chinese moral
right to rule, the forfeiture of which often presaged
an imperial line-ending popular rebellion. Such fears
would seem especially vivid for those in the elite who
see their Communist "dynasty" plagued by corruption
at lower levels and headed by a fourth emperor who appears
not to be the equal of his predecessor or of the founding
emperor.
Second,
China's leaders also realize that they are, and that
they need to remain, the heirs to the party of Yan'an
and Civil War days - the populist and popular organization
that rode to power on a wave of support from the masses,
especially the peasantry. In this respect, Falun Gong
and groups like it may be more disconcerting than pro-democracy
dissidents and overtly political movements. The democracy
and human rights activists of the 1970s and 1980s and
the student-led demonstrations of the late 1980s may
have been dangerous signals of discontent among China's
rising generation of educated elites. But such movements
appear to become most worrisome to party and government
leaders when they link up with ordinary city-dwellers
and unauthorized workers' organizations, as they did
during the Tiananmen demonstrations and related pro-democracy
drives in 1989. Falun Gong has shown that it holds considerable
appeal for an urban mass base, with even official PRC
sources' low-end estimates reporting millions of followers.
While many of its adherents are relatively privileged
white-collar and educated types, Falun Gong seems to
be most attractive to those who have not fared especially
well during the reform era, including the elderly, the
unemployed and many people socialized under high socialism
who have not managed a comfortable transition to a market-based
order.
Although
the evidence is far more sketchy, Falun Gong does have
many adherents in China's villages as well. The kinds
of ideas and practices associated with the group could
be expected to resonate with the inhabitants of the
vast countryside no less than with the urbanites who
have been Falun Gong's core constituency. If they do
catch on more widely, such teachings and activities
could become ideological and organizational focal points
for the widespread but still-diffuse resentment that
rural residents feel about corruption, favoritism, taxes,
fees, and a host of other issues of economics and fairness.
Party leaders appear to have taken Falun Gong's demonstrated
and prospective mass appeal seriously, and have sought
to undermine it. In reports that often quote ordinary
people who have renounced the group or claim to have
been harmed by it, the official media have repeatedly
attacked Li Hongzhi and Falun Gong's agents as liars
and frauds who have duped common folk and ruined their
health or even cost them their lives.
Third,
the Chinese Communist Party remains a self-consciously
Leninist institution. On this score, Falun Gong touched
a pair of sensitive nerves. Its ability to enlist a
significant number of party members indicated weaknesses
in the party's internal discipline, which could put
at risk the party-state's capacity to govern. One striking
event early in the drive against Falun Gong was the
publication of an almost Cultural Revolution-style confession
by prominent Beijing adherent Li Qihua, a retired People's
Liberation Army lieutenant general who had impeccable
revolutionary credentials (having participated in the
Long March of the 1930s, the epic journey that the CCP
regards as its defining moment) and who had held extremely
sensitive posts (including director of the medical center
that treats China's top leaders). And there have been
other revelations of senior cadres' and ordinary party
members' and government officials' involvement in Falun
Gong's activities, including the April demonstration
outside Zhongnanhai. To deal with such problems, the
party's central leadership issued the most heavily emphasized
measure of the current campaign. It directed Communist
Party members who had joined the "cult" to sever their
ties and required participation in re-education sessions
- exercises reminiscent of the pre-reform era that included
criticism sessions and study of approved documents to
reinstill the ideological rectitude expected of those
who staff the party, state and army apparatuses.
Falun
Gong represents a challenge to the party-state's Leninist
monopoly of organization, especially political organization.
The group's internal workings remain shadowy, perhaps
even to those trying to crush it. Although official
PRC sources have asserted that it is highly organized,
most accounts indicate that Falun Gong does not have
an elaborate command structure. But that fact, if true,
may give little comfort to party officials who are worried
about the political impact of Falun Gong and similar
groups. The CCP itself, after all, spent many of its
early years in scattered cells and fragmented revolutionary
base areas, held together largely by a common set of
values and goals and (at times) an acknowledged set
of leaders. And the CCP did it without modern technology,
such as the internet and cell phones, which Falun Gong
and contemporary political dissidents have employed,
or even faxes, which the pro-democracy activists of
1989 used effectively. The eerily spontaneous-seeming
appearance of thousands of Falun Gong followers in central
Beijing in April and in several cities on more recent
occasions show, at the very least, an effective substitute
for a strong, conventional organizational apparatus.
Whatever
Falun Gong's institutional characteristics, party leaders
have been determined to dismantle the organization,
resorting to techniques reminiscent of the Mao era as
well as the post-Tiananmen period. In addition to the
traditional vehicle of a party-led, propaganda-laden
campaign targeting the masses and study sessions for
errant cadres, the regime has deployed the relatively
new legal tools that are a much-touted hallmark of the
reform era.
Like
many political dissident groups in recent years, Falun
Gong and its umbrella entity, the Falun Dafa Research
Institute, have been branded "illegal organizations."
The authorities have condemned them for conducting public
activities without having the proper permits and registration
- approvals that were, at best, unlikely to have been
granted once Falun Gong had begun to be identified as
an unsavory association a few years ago. As has happened
to participants in other unauthorized and semi-organized
mass movements, many of the group's members have been
arrested - or, more commonly, detained without arrest
- and Li Hongzhi has been cited for offenses relating
to the establishment and operation of an illegal organization.
Chief among these is the innocuous-sounding but legally
and politically significant crime of disturbing the
public order. Claims in the press that Falun Gong's
plans included challenging the party and government,
and that participation in the sect had driven some members
to murder or suicide, suggested that more serious criminal
charges could follow. Fourth, the reform-era Chinese
leadership has defined itself largely as directing a
developmental state, thereby claiming legitimacy on
the basis of the rising levels of material prosperity
that have been the defining achievement of the Deng
and post-Deng era. Groups like Falun Gong point unnervingly
to two possible weaknesses in this strategy. Most simply,
the group's popularity among those who have not done
particularly well under the reforms underscores the
perils of betting too heavily on economic growth. Falun
Gong's rapid ascension suggests that mechanisms could
emerge quickly to channel and amplify discontent arising
from general or sectoral economic pain -- hardly an
idle worry for generally pro-reform leaders facing problems
that include the unresolved plight of the losers in
previous rounds of reform, the current leveling off
of growth rates in even the booming coastal cities,
and the soon-unavoidable costs of restructuring state-owned
industries and banks.
Falun
Gong's appeal also suggests that, while "to get rich
is glorious," it may not be enough for everyone. The
rise of such a group (like the revival of more conventional
religions) is a reminder of moral or spiritual needs,
ones that the CCP's widely disdained Marxism-Leninism/Mao
Zedong Thought/Deng Xiaoping Theory or its watered-down
campaigns for "socialist spiritual civilization" have
not been able to fill. Some proponents of the crackdown
on Falun Gong may even have seen the movement's popularity
as a sign that some of the theories of Western social
science could be right - that the turn to markets in
the economic realm leads to the emergence of a marketplace
of ideas and pressures for democracy. If so, and despite
the group's lack of affinity for contemporary Western-style
political norms, the apparent popular demand for Falun
Gong could indicate dangerous stresses in the structure
of "market-Leninism." Whatever their particular analyses
of the situation, conservative elements in the leadership
appear to have seen in the Falun Gong controversy an
opportunity to reinvigorate the party's ideological
work through a mass campaign and intra-party rectification
-- pursuits that have strikingly, and almost surely
by design, slighted the reform era's dominant rhetoric
of market-oriented growth.
Fifth,
and partly reflecting a sense of the risks of relying
on economic performance as the basis for the party's
claim of a right to rule, China's post-Mao administration
has recast itself as a nationalist regime. In doing
so, the party has partly returned to its roots, evoking
its role as the principal force fighting against the
Japanese and for national unity in the 1930s and 1940s.
The strategy also has stressed more recent goals and
accomplishments, including the PRC's acknowledged rise
as a world power and its related march toward redemption
of the remaining humiliations of nineteenth-century
colonialism by means of the reintegration of Hong Kong,
Macau and, it hopes, Taiwan. In recent years, the regime
has played the nationalism card as its ideological trump
in attempting to undercut support for dissent. Time
and again, from the Democracy Wall in 1979 through the
democracy movement in 1989 to the China Democracy Party
in 1998-99, official sources have vigorously denounced
the regime's adversaries as the tools of foreign interests
and, at least implicitly, as traitors to China. Both
drawing upon and stirring up popular nativist sentiments,
this approach seems to have had some success against
those pro-democracy dissidents who have drawn inspiration
from Western thinkers and developed contacts with like-minded
foreigners and exiled dissidents.
This
tactic has been largely unavailable, however, against
so clearly home-grown a group as Falun Gong. Despite
party spokesmen's best efforts, it appears that they
cannot make much out of the fact that Falun Gong's leader
now lives in New York or that some of its internet communications
originate abroad. The official press has called the
group a tool of behind-the-scenes foreign forces and
a product of alien cultural infiltration. But those
accusations seem to ring hollow when directed against
a strikingly indigenous enterprise espousing heavily
non-Western doctrines. Some of the claims are tortured
indeed, blaming a hostile Western- dominated international
environment for the party's vulnerability to the kinds
of eruptions of feudal superstition manifested in Falun
Gong.
Groups
like Falun Gong put the party's nationalist recipe under
considerable strain in a more general way as well. While
the CCP's recent ideology has touted many aspects of
Chinese values and has embraced wholeheartedly the goal
of a rich and powerful China, it has been, at best,
abidingly queasy about many elements of traditional
Chinese culture, especially the more anarchistic and
supernaturalist strains. Campaigns against Falun Gong
or similar groups risk exposing a gap between such elite
agendas and authentically Chinese popular proclivities.
The official press's odd trotting out of eminent scientists
to expose Li Hongzhi's superstitious nonsense and pseudo-science
strikes a tinny note, more in tune with a stale Marxist
or post-Mao technocratic faith in a simplistic form
of scientific rationalism than with the kinds of sentiments
at the grassroots that have provided fertile soil for
Falun Gong. The shrill tone and scattershot approach
of the broader campaign against the "cult" bespeak a
high level of elite agitation or an attempt to convey
the intensity of the authorities' opposition more than
they suggest confidence that the denunciations will
resonate with, or persuade, a Chinese mass audience.
Finally,
China's leaders during the last two decades have abandoned
pretensions to totalitarianism in favor of a more accommodating
form of undemocratic rule. They have bound their party
to an implicit social contract with their citizenry:
Ordinary Chinese can enjoy spheres of autonomy and room
for private pursuits, free from political scrutiny and
ideological demands, so long as they do not use that
"space" to engage in political activities that might
challenge the regime. The PRC's rulers thus have permitted
and, in return, demanded a "depoliticization" or "civilianization"
of a wide range of social and economic activity.
The
flap over Falun Gong has exposed some ambiguities in
this contract's terms, and revealed a possible penchant
among the leadership for narrowing, illiberal constructions.
The issue has been how "political" an enterprise Falun
Gong is or could become. The group's principal visible
activities and its avowed aims are apolitical enough.
The official account, of course, has painted a radically
different picture of a megalomaniac and his followers
plotting to overthrow the party and the law, and to
take the place of the government.
There
is a more subtle question here as well. At some point
in the emergence of a civil society, initially non-political
organizations typically begin to seek a voice in how
they are governed, especially with respect to policies
that directly affect the group and the issues it sees
as important. Some of Falun Gong's activities might
be perceived as scattered signs of that sort of development
in Chinese society. This is particularly true of the
mass gatherings at public buildings by members seeking
official recognition for the group and protesting the
escalating government-imposed restrictions on their
activities. Although some of those acts were precipitated
by the regime's own moves against Falun Gong, such modest
signs of potential pressure from below for structural
political change may be enough, in the eyes of some
of China's top leaders, to have warranted a sharpening
of the post-Mao era's blunted authoritarian edge. An
apparent dip in the political fortunes of Premier Zhu
Rongji and the agenda of bold reform presumably has
meant stronger support for a hard line against Falun
Gong. At the same time, the care taken to assuage the
worries of practitioners of approved religions and ordinary
qigong suggests that much of the leadership was ambivalent
about, or at least aware of the delicacy of, undertakings
that could appear to compromise some of the reform era's
defining promises.
As
has occurred regularly in the PRC's suppression of political
dissent movements, the fear of chaos, luan, has been
the subtext (and sometimes the text) of the call for
repressive measures against Falun Gong. Ironically,
such apprehension about the changes spawned by liberalization
has sounded relatively plausible precisely because political
reform in China has been so limited. What otherwise
might be unremarkable features in the emergence of a
robust civil society can seem to portend disarray where
there are not adequate public institutions to channel
and incorporate such demands and participation from
below.
None
of this, of course, means that Falun Gong really has
imperiled Communist Party rule or that party leaders
think it has - unless Jiang Zemin and his subordinates
have information about the power of the group, or the
weakness of the party, that differs wildly from what
outside observers have seen or believed to be possible.
While it is not inconceivable that Falun Gong will survive
and will someday grow into a major danger in its own
right, for now it has been more a Rorschach test for
China's rulers. In Falun Gong, they can see traces of
the traits that, if repeated on a much larger scale
and sustained for a much longer period, could strike
hard at the party's principal weak points and undermine
each of the major pillars of its right and ability to
rule. And the leadership in Beijing surely has recognized
that there is little reason to believe that Falun Gong's
particular organization and doctrines have had a unique
and irreproducible appeal. To the extent that the drive
against Falun Gong exceeds the usual harsh response
meted out to groups posing similarly modest threats,
the reason may well be that Chinese leaders have sensed
that the group symbolizes or foreshadows more serious
hazards.
Jacques
deLisle is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute and Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
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